This paper proposes a theory of government debt which, as opposed to previous theories, delivers an interior steady state that is independent of initial debt. The key elements are nominal public debt and a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy choices.
Introduction
All governments from developed countries have positive debt. In most cases the size of the debt is not negligible. For example, the average debt-to-GDP ratio for developed countries that belong to the OECD 1 was around 50% between 1980 and 2001.
Existing theories are successful in explaining why debt changes and motivating why debt is accumulated. However, none of these models is able to deliver a steady state level of debt that is independent of initial debt, that is neither zero nor equal to some upper bound. Hence, even though we can think of reasons why governments would like to issue debt, we do not understand why debt is what it is. In other words, we lack a theory of the level of government debt. This is the issue addressed here.
The model proposed has an economy with no capital and no uncertainty. Households value consumption and leisure, and use money carried over from the previous period to buy goods. There is a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy choices. For simplicity, assume for now that there are no labor taxes and hence governments finance a given level of expenditure by issuing one-period nominal bonds and printing money.
The inflation tax is, first of all, a tax. Hence, there is a motive for debt due to "interest rate manipulation", as first suggested by Lucas and Stokey (1983) . The argument goes as follows. An increase in borrowing by the government in period t increases labor and consumption at t because of lower taxation. The increase in consumption lowers the interest rate between t and t + 1. This is good for the government since it lowers the burden of the debt service. The same mechanism occurs in reverse for the interest rate between t − 1 and t and so the burden of the debt service at t − 1 increases. The two effects cancel out except for the initial period, when there is no previous period (this is the time-inconsistency problem). Since the government cannot commit, every period is in this sense like the first, i.e. there is always an incentive to increase the debt 2 .
On the other hand, inflation, as opposed to labor taxes, has another effect: it lowers the real value of nominal claims. In effect, by printing more money, the government increases the price level, which in turn lowers the real value of the beginning-of-period debt. So the government has the incentive to reduce the debt now through higher inflation.
There are then two opposing effects determining the actions of the government, which are driven by the lack of commitment. One -the "tax effect"-induces the government to delay taxation and hence increase the debt, while the other -the "price effect"-gives reason to tax now and thus reduce the debt. A positive theory of debt should have the tax effect dominating for low levels of debt and the price effect dominating for high levels of debt. In this way, one ensures the existence of a steady state level of debt that is neither zero nor a corner solution.
Government policy is characterized using Markov strategies, which are time-consistent by construction. This implies that policy depends only on pay-off relevant variables and so there is no consideration for other mechanisms such as reputation, which may be potentially relevant. The idea for this is to have a model in which we can understand the basic mechanism that delivers steady state debt.
The long-run level of debt will depend crucially on the costs of inflation. If households are not particularly hurt by inflation, then it might be the case that the incentive to reduce the real value of debt always outweighs the incentive to increase it, and the government ends up having zero, or even negative, debt in the long run. One way to avoid this when the utility function of households is separable in consumption and leisure, is to assume a sufficiently low intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This makes it more costly for the government to reduce current consumption in exchange for higher future consumption, i.e. it reduces the incentive to inflate prices today to reduce the real value of debt.
To evaluate the model quantitatively, it is modified to include labor taxes. The model is then calibrated to match selected target statistics from the US economy, most importantly its debt-to-GDP ratio. Although the model fits the US economy well, it has a hard time delivering high levels of long-run debt, say double or triple those of the US. One reason for this is that inflating prices to reduce the real value of debt becomes very rapidly a dominant strategy for a government with debt. This leaves open the question of what else matters for debt: is it self-control, reputation, central bank independence, political economy reasons, etc.? The answer is not clear, since any mechanism would have to work such that it only reduces the incentive to inflate prices, i.e. leaving the incentive to delay taxation and increase debt relatively unaltered.
Permanent changes in target statistics have small effects on long-run debt. This is consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that countries with similar levels of public debt have very different levels of government expenditure to GDP, taxes and inflation rates. As Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue, economic variables alone do not seem to explain why some countries accumulate more public debt than others 3 . So the deterministic version of this model predicts that differences in debt among countries are explained only by how easy or difficult it is for households to substitute away from goods that are being taxed by inflation. If it is difficult, then the cost for the government of inflating prices today is high and hence the incentives to increase debt and delay taxation are greater. It is not clear whether this alone can satisfactorily explain cross-country differences and more work should be devoted to incorporate other motives for debt into the model or -as mentioned above-features that reduce the incentive to inflate prices.
By considering the case of stochastic government expenditure, it can be shown that the model explains qualitatively well why governments raise their debt when expenditure temporarily increases. This is in agreement with previous theories of debt. The model differs in that it does not predict tax-smoothing.
Modern theories of government debt started with Barro (1974) and the Ricardian equivalence result. In this case, taxes are lump-sum and hence, the composition of expenditure finance is irrelevant 4 . Later, Barro (1979) showed that when exogenous government expenditure fluctuates, debt should be used to smooth distortionary taxation. This model also explains how government debt increases during wartime, but some have pointed out that it does not explain why debt has recently increased in several countries during peacetime. More importantly, the theory predicts that debt levels are irrelevant for current debt issue, i.e. debt moves randomly, in accordance with government expenditure and income shocks. In this sense, this is a theory of the change in debt, not its level.
The empirical predictions of Barro's model have been contested by a number of studies. For example, Trehan and Walsh (1990) reject the tax-smoothing hypothesis for the US between 1914 and 1986, although they cannot reject it for the post-war period. Bohn (1998) shows that the debt over GDP ratio in the US displays mean-reversion if one controls for wartime spending and cyclical fluctuations. In other words, government policy reacts to changes in the debt-to-income ratio.
In what could be viewed as a micro-foundation for Barro (1979) , we have the Ramsey problem of optimal taxation (see for example Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1991) . In this case, debt is used to absorb cyclical shocks and so fluctuates around some stationary value. In the absence of shocks, the government would basically increase debt in the first period and then never again. Thus, stationary steady state debt is not independent of initial debt.
In the political economy literature, there is a large number of models with partisan politicians that explain a bias towards debt. Two examples of this are Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) . These theories show how disagreement between parties, given lack of commitment, makes them use debt strategically to influence the behavior of future government incumbents. This type of stories are used to explain why certain countries have significantly larger amounts of government debt. A survey of this literature can be found in Persson and Tabellini (1998) .
In a recent paper, Krusell, Martin and Ríos-Rull (2004) show that a benevolent government with positive debt that cannot commit to future policy choices, has an incentive to increase the debt. The reason for this is "interest rate manipulation", as described earlier. Since there is always an incentive to increase the debt, the maximum level of debt the government can sustain with its tax revenue becomes a binding constraint. As it turn out, this implies that in equilibrium there are infinite but countable steady states. Hence, the implied dynamics looks remarkably similar to the commitment (Ramsey) case: the government increases debt for one or two periods and then leaves it constant. Thus, depending on the initial level of debt, long-run debt can be very low, very high or anything in between. This model shows that lack of commitment in an economy with distortionary taxation gives a sufficient motive for debt. Hence, one should interpret models with partisan politics and lack of commitment as providing a motive for over-accumulating debt.
As a side question, one could ask what constitutes public debt. As is standard in the literature, this paper takes the position that it is debt held by the public. Others, such as Eisner and Pieper (1984) , have argued that all assets and liabilities should be considered. Unfortunately, the valuation of these proves to be difficult, with problems ranging from technical to conceptual 5 . Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) provide a more detailed discussion on this.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a basic model with the sufficient elements to make a theory of debt. Section 3 adds fiscal policy and calibrates the model to fit certain facts of the US economy. It then provides some comparative statics to test the model and considers the case of stochastic government expenditure. Section 4 concludes.
A Basic Model of Government Debt

The economy
The basic model is similar to the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy. There is no capital and no uncertainty. There is a benevolent government that has to finance g every period. Output y is linear in labor y t = n t , which implies the aggregate resource constraint
The government can finance g by issuing nominal debt or printing money. Hence, it has to satisfy the following period budget constraint
where M is the aggregate money stock, B is nominal bonds, p is the price level and q is the nominal price of bonds (i.e. the inverse of the gross nominal interest rate). For individual levels of money and bonds, lets use lower case letters.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households that derive utility from consumption and leisure. The present value of lifetime utility is given by
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount factor and u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuous differentiable in both arguments.
There is a cash-in-advance constraint (as in Svensson, 1985) 
so as to have households hold positive money balances in equilibrium.
Since we are going to solve for government policy (and not just take it as given), it is important to describe the environment carefully. The government announces its policy at the beginning of the period. Next, as is standard in the cash-in-advance literature, the household divides into two agents, a shopper and a producer/seller. There are two subperiods: the goods market operates in the first subperiod and the securities market opens in the second. This timing is important: if the securities market were to open before the goods market, then there would be no aggregate state variables. To see this, note that prices and allocations at t would depend on M t+1 instead of M t , which would only appear in the government budget constraint together with B t . Even though individual money and bond holdings matter for the household, from an aggregate point of view, the composition of the government's nominal liabilities at the beginning of the period would be irrelevant. What is left then is the total amount of nominal claims -money and bonds-which is no state variable since its value is meaningless 6 .
In the first subperiod, the shopper takes the household's money balances and sets out to buy the consumption good from the -only-household that produces the variety he likes. The producer/seller stays at home, works n hours and sells the produced good in exchange for money. Instead of the usual "helicopter drop", the government issues money by buying g from each household. Hence, the government crowds-out shoppers in the goods market. Market clearing determines the price level.
In the second subperiod, the household becomes one again and the securities market opens. Each household carries bonds acquired in the previous period and money acquired from selling its output in the goods market, and chooses how much money and bonds it wants to carry to the next period. The government either buys or sells bonds, depending on its decision for M t+1 and B t+1 . Given the supply and demand for money and bonds, the nominal interest rate adjusts to clear the securities market.
This sequence of events implies the following consolidated budget constraint for the household:
Solving the competitive equilibrium
It is convenient to write the problem of the household recursively since this simplifies the formulation of the government's problem. To do so, we need first to make a few transformations 7 (see for example, Cooley and Hansen (1991) . First, note from the market clearing conditions that a sufficient statistic to determine aggregate prices is the relation between the aggregate money stock and bonds. Hence, we can have the aggregate state variable of the economy be B t /M t 8 . It will be useful then to redefine individual and aggregate nominal variables (except for q) by dividing them by the aggregate money stock, i.e. for any nominal variable
Furthermore, define the money growth rate µ as
Using the above and switching to recursive notation (where primes denote next period variables) we can rewrite the government budget constraint (2) as
the household budget constraint (4) as
and after using the above, the cash-in advance constraint (3) as
Given some government policy {B = B(B), µ = µ(B)} that satisfies the government budget constraint (5), the problem of the household can be written as follows
Taking the first-order conditions gives
Apply the envelope theorem
where π is the rate of inflation between today and tomorrow, to write the equations determining prices
Note thatp is really a function of the aggregate state in the following period, i.e.p = P(B ). This function indicates the price level induced by government policy in equilibrium.
Putting (8) and (9) together we get a simpler expression for the nominal price of bonds
and the real price of bonds (i.e. the inverse of the gross real interest rate)
In equilibrium we havem =M = 1 and the cash-in-advance constraint binds, so
The problem of the government
Assume the government has no access to commitment and that any reputational mechanisms are not operative. This means that the current government has to set its policy for the period based on fundamentals and taking as given the policy of future governments and that households will behave competitively. Since the government is benevolent it will choose its policy so as to maximize the discounted utility of the representative household.
Time-inconsistency problems arise when the strategies of future governments are taken into account by the current government when solving for the optimal policy. Since bygones are bygones, future governments won't internalize this, just as the current government doesn't consider how its policy affected past decisions. Thus if the current government decided today all its actions from now on, it would change its mind in the future about what policy to implement.
Government policy is characterized using Markov strategies, which are time-consistent by construction. Markov strategies depend only on pay-off relevant variables, in this case the state variable,B. Hence, trigger strategies are ruled out and so there is no consideration for reputation.
From equations (8) and (10) we can see that the time-inconsistency comes from two sources, the price level and the price of bonds (the latter through the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure tomorrow, which due to (1) and (12) depend on tomorrow's price level). Both variables depend on the price level tomorrow, which in turn depends on tomorrow's government policy, i.e. they depend on P(B ). But the government tomorrow won't take into account that its policy affects prices today and thus the time-inconsistency. Note that if the utility function is separable and logarithmic in consumption, one of the sources of the timeinconsistency cancels out 9 asp would be only a function of current variables. This will play an important role later on.
From the aggregate resource constraint (1) and the cash-in-advance constraint (12) we have that if we knowp, then we know consumption (1/p) and leisure (1−1/p−g). Putting together the first-order conditions of the household (8) and (10), and the government budget constraint (5) gives µ as a function ofB,B ,p and P(B )
so that it can be taken out from the government's problem. Moreover, we can now summarize the first-order conditions of the household and the government budget constraint in a single equation
Call the left hand side η(B,B ,p, P(B )). Note that (13) has to be satisfied in any competitive equilibrium, i.e. for any equilibrium debt function B(B), the equilibrium price function P(B) has to satisfy η(B, B(B), P(B), P(B(B))) = 0.
One way to write the problem of the government recursively is to have it chooseB andp, givenB and P(B ) and subject to (1), (12) and (13). As mentioned above, the function P is an equilibrium object that refers to the price induced by the policy adopted by governments. The current government is of course not constrained to satisfy P, but will do so in equilibrium 10 .
Lets for now restrict the analysis to differentiable equilibria, i.e. ones in which B and P are differentiable. Later on, this assumption will be relaxed to show that there is also a non-differentiable equilibrium that may be interpreted as generated by triggers.
So, given the perception that future governments will induce P(B), the problem of the current government is
A Markov-Perfect equilibrium is then a set of functions {V, B, P} that solves the above problem. The model can be solved numerically as outlined in the appendix. The presence of P(B ) in the constraint makes the problem atypical. In particular, if we were to take the first-order conditions to the problem of the government, we would have to deal with the derivative of the price function (more on this below). The method proposed in the appendix approximates the equilibrium functions globally.
It is possible to greatly simplify the problem by assuming a suitable functional form for the utility function. This will allow us to build some intuition and get some analytical results. We can then verify numerically that the results hold for more general utility functions.
Suppose the utility function is
Since now u = γ 11 , equation (13) gives a closed-form solution forp as a function ofB,B and P(B ). After some rearrangement we get the following consumption function (which by the cash-in-advance constraint is the inverse ofp)
10 The government's problem is like solving its best response to the strategies of future governments. 11 Note that this implies r = 1 β − 1, i.e. the government cannot affect the real interest rate.
So, given some P(B) and assuming the inequality constraint doesn't bind, the problem of the current government can be simply written as follows
The first-order condition, after applying the envelope theorem, is
This equation is known as the Generalized Euler Equation (GEE). What makes it special is that after applying the envelope theorem, we don't get rid of the derivatives of all choice variables; in particular, the GEE has P B . This makes the problem atypical since now there is one more unknown than equations. The appearance of P B in the GEE reflects the time-inconsistency problem. The current government has to take into account how its actions affect the policy choices of future governments. This effect is usually washed-off by the envelope condition; but this is not the case when there is no commitment, since the current government is not taking into account how its actions affect previous governments' actions. It is also clear from (16) that if the equilibrium price function is not differentiable, then it is not possible to characterize the equilibrium using first-order conditions.
The GEE basically states the trade-off faced by the government: equating the marginal effects today and (present value) tomorrow of changing the current debt-to-money ratio. Typically, because inflation is distortionary, the gap between marginal utilities, C −σ − γ, is strictly positive. Hence, a positive effect on consumption today will be offset by lower consumption tomorrow, and viceversa. For example, if instead of staying put, the government decides to increase the debt-to-money ratio, the real price will be lower and hence, consumption will be higher. Tomorrow, since there is more debt, the government has to raise more revenue, which implies a higher distortion, and hence, lower consumption.
The following proposition establishes the predictions of the model for long-run debt.
Proposition 1 If the utility function is as in (14) then there exist two steady states that satisfy the GEE (16). One is the first-best and the other hasB
Proof. In steady state, the GEE simplifies to
Hence, either C −σ − γ = 0 or CB + Cp PB + βCB = 0. The first-best is where u c = u , i.e. C −σ − γ = 0, so it satisfies the GEE.
To find the second steady state, first get
Hence, any steady state -other than the Pareto-has to satisfy
which can be rearranged to
Since β (1+B)p = 0, and PB = 0 cannot happen in steady state 12 , we havê
Given thatp > 0 in any equilibrium, we haveB
The first-best impliesp = γ 1 σ , µ = β − 1 and q = 1 (i.e. the Friedman rule). The debt-to-money ratio at the Pareto optimum isB
1 − β which -given the restrictions on parameter values-is always less than minus one. So the first-best has negative nominal debt larger -in absolute value-than the money stock. Having large enough positive claims on the private sector allows the government to finance its expenditure, while deflating such that the nominal interest rate is zero. It is possible to verify numerically that the Pareto optimum is an unstable steady state.
On the other hand, we can verify numerically that the second-best steady state is stable. Hence, Proposition 1 shows that if the utility function is logarithmic in consumption (i.e. σ = 1) then governments with positive debt will gradually eliminate it. More importantly, the proposition shows that given a low enough intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the long-run level of government debt will be positive. We can also verify numerically that this result holds as long as we assume that consumption and leisure are separable, i.e. it is not necessary to assume linear utility in leisure.
As mentioned above, when σ = 1, one of the sources of time-inconsistency cancels out, namely the one coming from (8), i.e. the price level. With lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution than log-utility, current consumption becomes less elastic, making it more costly for the government to reduce current consumption in exchange for higher future consumption, i.e. reducing the incentive to inflate prices today to reduce the real value of debt. Hence, at least for low levels of debt, the government has an incentive to increase it.
With a very simple model it is possible to predict a positive long-run level of government debt. The key elements are nominal government debt and lack of commitment. It is important to remark that the factor that enables the model to deliver a positive level of long-run debt, is not the intertemporal elasticity of substitution per se, but rather how costly inflation is, i.e. how difficult it is for the household to substitute current consumption for another good. In the case of the separable, logutility function, the relevant trade-off for the household is consumption today versus consumption tomorrow. If the utility function is non-separable and of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) class, then the relevant trade-off will be between current consumption and leisure. Say for example that
In this case, the relevant parameter will be ρ. To get a positive level of long-run debt, ρ will have to be negative, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure has to be less than one, meaning the goods are complements. In this way, the household finds it difficult to substitute consumption for leisure and inflating prices becomes costly, thus reducing the government's motive to decrease the debt. 
Multiple equilibria
So far the assumption has been that the solution is differentiable. As it turns out, there is another solution for B(B) that is discontinuous. This solution solves the government problem but doesn't satisfy the GEE with equality. Krusell and Smith (2003) and Krusell, Martin and Ríos-Rull (2004) also find co-existence of continuous and discrete solutions (in the case of the latter, only for negative debt). This seems to be a recurring feature in this class of models.
The discrete solution looks like a step function (see Figure 2 ). For certain neighborhoods of debt levels, the government chooses the same level for tomorrow. For particular levels of debt, the government's decision rule is discontinuous, i.e. it decides to increase or decrease debt suddenly by a large amount. At some intervals, the solution is differentiable and not flat. Here, the GEE is satisfied with equality.
This solution can be best described as a generated by triggers. The non-differentiable equilibrium reflects self-fulfilling strategies: given that future government behavior looks like a step function, the optimal response for the current government is also a step function. This equilibrium is an artifice of the infinite horizon since it is not the limit of finite horizon economies 13 . It is also an artifice of the recursive representation of the model. Basically, the functional representation of Markov strategies has "space to spare", in the sense that we can construct equilibria that are not the limit of finite horizon equilibria. We can use this as a selection device to prefer the differentiable equilibrium over the non-differentiable.
The discount factor plays an important role in how the equilibrium looks like. If β is high enough, then the equilibrium has infinitely many -but countable-steady states. This is the case shown in Figure 2 . If is low enough then we still get a step function, but one that doesn't touch the 45-degree line except at the smooth equilibrium steady state.
How is this solution found? Start by identifying the long-run level of debt of the differentiable equilibrium, B * . Next, create a grid with n points of debt, where x i , i = 1, . . . , n refers to grid point i. Then let x n =B * and choose a lower bound (say x 1 = 0).
Since x n is a steady state, we know the values of V(x n ) and P(x n ). Next, pick x n−1 and let p * n−1 be the real price level if x n−1 was a steady state. Then check which of the following expressions is higher:
This will tell whether the government prefers to stay at x n−1 or increase debt to x n . Note that because of monotonicity of the solution, it is not necessary to check whether the government wanted to increase debt beyondB * .
Next we move to x n−2 and compare the values of staying at x n−2 or increasing debt to x n−1 or x n . Continue this process for all remaining grid points.
After solving to the left ofB * , we proceed to solve to the right of it, using a similar technique. Note that the whole procedure didn't involve a single iteration, hence the only numerical errors come from the size of the grid.
To verify that the obtained solution {V, B, P} is indeed an equilibrium, we check the one-shot deviation to the solutions found, i.e. for everyB, we solve the government's problem given P(B ) and V(B ).
The commitment case
Lets show that the assumption about whether there is commitment or not, is critical. The argument is that if the government could commit to all its future policy choices then it would change the debt in the first period and then never again. Thus with commitment, the model does not provide any predictions for long-run debt, as it would depend entirely on the initial level of debt.
Say the utility function is as in (14) and with σ = 1. Combining and rearranging the two first-order conditions of the household, the cash-in-advance constraint and the government budget constraint delivers
and µ = β γc − 1. The Ramsey problem would normally be solved by finding the Ramsey allocation, i.e. finding {B} ∞ t=0 that givenB 0 maximizes the discounted utility of the household. This is a bit problematic since the expression for consumption at t -given by equation (17)-is a function of consumption at t + 1.
As it turns out, a simple transformation will allow the problem to be posted recursively. Let Taking the first-order condition and applying the envelope theorem gives
which implies that c = c for every B. Hence, the solution is B = B, which in turn impliesB =B, i.e. the government keeps the debt constant.
The first-stage problem is max
subject to
A government with initial positive debt always reduces it in the first period. If σ was larger than 1, then we would have something similar as in the case of the government without commitment: the government increases the debt for low levels of debt and decreases it for high levels. Nevertheless, the solution for the second-stage problem is the same, i.e. the government does not change the level of debt after the initial period.
Quantitative Evaluation of the Model
The model outlined in the previous section is useful to show how we can construct a theory of debt, but it is a bit too simple if we are interested in testing it quantitatively to see how good a theory we have. One important omission is fiscal policy. Unfortunately, one cannot just include labor taxes to the simple model. The reason for this is that labor taxes and inflation would distort the same margin since from the aggregate resource constraint consumption and labor differ only by a constant 14 . A Markov government would tax the good with a higher base (labor in this case) while subsidizing the other. Why? Because in this way it wants to have both taxes behave as one lump-sum: by taxing more than it needs, it can give part of it back to offset the disincentive to work. The problem with this is that in equilibrium, the government will set the labor tax rate as high as possible and the inflation rate as low as possible, so as to minimize the distortion. In the absence of bounds, the labor tax rate goes to infinity. With bounds, we get a corner solution 15 .
To prevent the above we need to have government policy distort two different margins. A simple way to do it is to have credit goods, i.e. goods that are not purchased with money. The aggregate resource constraint then becomes
where c 1 is consumption of the cash good and c 2 is consumption of the credit good. The introduction of labor taxes and credit goods doesn't significantly modify the environment of the basic model. The economy is now described by (18) and the following equations
which are the government budget constraint, the cash-in-advance constraint and the household's budget constraint, respectively.
The private sector
Given some utility function u(c 1 , c 2 , ) satisfying the usual assumptions, we can solve for the competitive equilibrium. The first-order conditions of the household's problem are
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint. In addition, the cash-in-advance constraint binds, and so
14 Making g endogenous doesn't solve this problem since the household takes it parametrically, i.e. as if it were a constant. 15 For an example of this in a real economy with labor and capital incomes taxes, see Martin (2004) .
The problem of the government
From (18) and (23) −1. Hence, we can write the government budget constraint as a function of n, n = N (B ),p,p = P(B ),B andB , i.e.
Call the left hand side of this equation η(B,B , n,p). The notation has been abbreviated, as n and p depend onB . We also need to include the inequality constraint implied by the household's first-order condition (20), i.e. u c1 − u c2 ≥ 0.
Call the left hand side of this equation ε(n,p).
So, given the perception that future governments will induce N and P, the problem of the government can be written as
A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of functions {V, B, N , P} that solves the above problem. After taking the first-order conditions and applying the envelope theorem we get the following static and dynamic GEEs (assume for now that the inequality constraint doesn't bind)
If on the other hand, the inequality constraint binds then we have
where ξ =p 2 εp ηB ηp ε n −p 2 εp η n Note that ηB contains both N B and P B and so this is not a standard recursive problem. To solve it numerically, use the procedure from the appendix.
A qualitative analysis of the solution
Before attempting a calibration of the model it is useful to analyze it qualitatively. As in the case of the simpler model of the previous section, the typical debt function B(B) is increasing and has a steady state. What is more interesting is how labor taxes and the money growth rate interact with each other. As Figure  3 shows, both tax instruments are substitutes: the labor tax is decreasing in debt and the money rate is increasing in debt. The reason for this is that the government -instead of distorting all margins a littletaxes the margin with the highest return and tries to minimize the distortion of the other margin. When debt is low, consumption of the cash good and labor are both high, but labor has the biggest tax base. Hence, the government taxes labor heavily and runs a disinflation so as to minimize the cash-in-advance distortion. When debt is high, it is still true that labor is higher than consumption of the cash good, but in this case inflating prices has an added bonus: it decreases the real value of government debt. This incentive makes inflation a more attractive source of funds and so the government inflates prices while it reduces the labor tax significantly (and may even subsidize labor). So, with higher debt there is a shift from labor income taxation to inflation. This policy scheme implies that inflation and the nominal interest rate are increasing functions of debt, while the real interest rate is a decreasing function of debt.
The steady state level of debt depends again on the appropriate elasticity of substitution. Take for example a utility function that is separable and exhibits a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the cash good, say
In this case, the steady state level of debt (call itB * ) will depend heavily on σ 1 . We can verify numerically that, as in the case of the simple model of the previous section, if σ 1 > 1 thenB * > 0, if σ 1 = 1 thenB * = 0 and if σ 1 < 1 thenB * < 0.
If the utility function is non-separable and exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution between the cash and the credit good, as in
then the steady state level of debt will depend critically on ρ. In this case, to get a positive steady state level of debt, ρ will have to be negative, i.e. cash and credit goods have to be complements. The reason for this is similar to that outlined in the previous section. If the household can easily substitute cash goods for credit goods, then inflation becomes a cheap -in terms of distortions-source of funds for the government and the gains from reducing the debt increase.
Calibration
The next step is to calibrate the model so that its steady state matches selected statistics of the US economy. The first thing to do is choose a functional form for the utility function, so that we know all the parameters involved in the exercise. The choice is (24), since it makes it easy to match parameters with targets and allows to target inflation and the level of debt separately. This particular functional form exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution between the cash and the credit good and is Cobb-Douglas (and thus unit elastic) between (αc
1/ρ and leisure. As noted above, the key parameter to determine the size and sign of debt in steady state is ρ. The parameters to calibrate are then α, β, γ, ρ, σ and g. The selected target statistics are B/py, c 1 /c 2 , g/y, n, π and R -the nominal interest rate-in the US for the period 1962-2001.
In models with a cash-in-advance constraint, the period length is usually short -either a month or a quarter-to account for the counterfactual implication that the velocity of money in terms of consumption is equal to one. Then we would determine what cash goods are, through a suitable choice of a monetary aggregate. Next, α and ρ would be pinned down by a regression using (22) (see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1991) . This is not the approach followed here. Since the inflation tax plays a role in determining long-run debt, it is important to target its tax base. In this case, the most appropriate monetary aggregate seems to be M 1 . The problem is that M 1 is larger than quarterly consumption; hence, the period has to be longer, say a year.
By subtracting the definition of money from consumption of nondurable goods and services we get the amount of credit goods consumed in a year. Then we get our target value for c 1 /c 2 , which is equal to 0.41 for the period 1962-2001.
To target debt, we can use data from the Congressional Budget Office (2004) . The series of debt held by public -i.e. excluding holdings by federal agencies-in terms of GDP, averages 36% for the period 1962-2001. This figure includes the holdings of Federal Reserve Banks, which amount to 5% of GDP. Hence, the target for debt over GDP is 31%.
Data from the Federal Reserve System shows that the nominal interest rate for the 1-year constant maturity Treasury Bill, averaged 6.7% annual. Next, use the annual variation of the consumption of nondurable and services deflator as the measure for inflation, which gives an average of 4.3% annual 16 . This implies a target real interest rate of 2.3% annual.
The fraction of time devoted to labor is set to 0.3, as is standard in the business cycle literature. The target for government expenditure over GDP is taken out of data from the Congressional Budget Office. Between 1962 and 2001, outlays of the Federal Government averaged 20% of GDP. Note that this figure includes transfers. Using the more traditional measure for g from the national accounts -which includes state expenditure, but not transfers-gives 20% as well. Now we need to choose parameter values that make the model match the targeted statistics. The discount factor is easy to calibrate. From equations (21) and (22) and sincep (1 + µ)/p ≡ (1 + π), we have that in steady state r = 1 β − 1, and so the value for β consistent with a real interest of 2.3% annual is 0.9775.
Given that the target for hours worked is 0.3 and for g/y is 0.2, g has to be equal to 0.06.
The rest of the parameters have to be fine-tuned through successive iterations, although most of them affect primarily only one statistic.
As described above, ρ is the main parameter determining long-run debt. The value of ρ is set to −3.205. Next, from the price of bonds equation (9) we get the following steady state condition
which sets the value of α to 0.0245.
Finally, set γ to 0.303 to get n = 0.3 and σ to 3.53 to match an annual inflation rate of 4.3%. Table 1 gives a summary of the parameter values chosen for the calibration exercise. Table 2 shows the steady state statistics of the artificial economy. It could seem as rather unfortunate that the model relies so heavily on one parameter -ρ-for its predictions on long-run debt. But it is not clear why other parameters should matter. In this sense, data from the OECD shows that countries with similar levels of government debt, have very different fundamentals (i.e. government expenditure, hours worked, inflation rate, etc.). The model is consistent with this observation. Moreover, what really matters is not so much the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods, but how easy or difficult it is for the private sector to substitute away from goods being taxed by inflation. More elaborated models may incorporate additional reasons why inflation is costly and reduce the quantitative role of ρ. To illustrate the difficulty of this, I consider a simple modification to the model in a later section.
The elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods implied by the benchmark parametrization is around a quarter. This means that cash and credit goods are (very) complementary. One could argue that these two goods are inherently substitutes. This comment has some merit, but one should also point out that the model is not alone in this respect. First, papers in the inflation cost literature -see Aiyagari, Brown and Eckstein (1998) and Erosa and Ventura (2002) -actually assume perfect complementarity between cash and credit goods. Second, consider that the cash-in-advance constraint implies that consumption of cash goods equals real balances. The money-in-utility function literature assumes complementarity between consumption and real balances (for example, Lucas (2000) sets the elasticity of substitution at 0.5). Hence, the implied behavior between money and consumption is somewhat similar.
Comparative statics
An interesting exercise to learn how the model behaves is to do some comparative statics. In particular, what happens to the long-run level of debt if we change one of the target statistics? This would allow us to understand what the model predicts for countries with different characteristics or for the same country when there is a permanent change in one of the target statistics. The idea is then to change parameters so that only a single target statistics is changed at a time. Moreover, ρ is left unchanged so that we can verify the effect on debt. Table 3 shows a summary of this exercise. The first thing is to look at what happens if government expenditure were higher. Let g increase to 0.08, so that government expenditure over GDP increases by a third. To keep the 4.3% annual inflation rate, we need to decrease σ accordingly. The result -compared to the benchmark case-is an increase in income taxes, from 19.7% to 26.4% and a 3.4 percentage point (or 11%) decrease of the debt over GDP ratio. Hence, a country with higher government expenditure would have less long-run debt. That permanent increases in expenditure are financed with taxes rather than debt, is in accordance with the traditional theories of debt. The way it works in this case is as follows. Higher government expenditure with the same fraction of time spent working implies less consumption. This means that the base for the inflation tax is lower. If debt is kept the same -or at least is not reduced significantly-this implies higher labor taxes. The lower long-run level of debt comes from the fact that the higher tax pressure makes pushing the tax burden to the future -i.e. increasing debt-less attractive. This is so since tax distortions are convex in the tax rate.
It is interesting to note that it is not possible to increase too much the steady state debt by decreasing g. If for example g/y is reduced to 1%, then debt over GDP increases to only 35%
17 . Further reductions of expenditure don't contribute much more.
The next column in table 3, involves reducing the fraction of hours worked to one quarter. Since the relative size of the public sector and the inflation rate are left unaltered, this change has almost no effect on debt.
Looking at data from the US since 1962, we can see a steady reduction of c 1 /c 2 . This can be attributed to continuous innovations in the financial system, which in general allow households to maintain lower stocks of M 1 . A reduction of c 1 /c 2 reduces the relative importance of the cash good. Hence, the government can inflate prices more since it is hurting the household less. This should imply a decrease of steady state debt. The impact of a change in c 1 /c 2 depends on its size. A moderate decrease -say 10%-achieves very little change in long-run debt. Table 3 shows the case where the ratio is reduced to its 1992-2001 average of 29.5%, almost 30% less than benchmark. In this case, the reduction in long-run debt is around 4%.
Another exercise is to verify the effect of a permanent reduction in the inflation rate. To reduce the inflation rate leaving everything else constant, we need to increase the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e. decrease σ. This raises the tax motive since households are less hurt by variations in consumption over time. In effect, the labor tax function shifts up (the money growth rate also shifts up, but only slightly). This decreases the motive for debt and the debt function shifts down. We get then a decrease in steady state inflation and debt, since we are basically moving down along the money growth rate function (which is increasing in debt). Table 3 shows the case of inflation being reduced to its 1992-2001 average of 2.4%, almost half the benchmark value. The reduction in long-run debt is roughly 3%, which amounts to 1% of GDP.
The final column of Table 3 shows the effect of an increase of the real interest rate, from 2.3% annual to 4.0% annual. This is a substantial change, but only delivers a bit more than 2.4% increase in long-run debt. The reason for the increase in steady state debt is that since households care less about the future, the government has more reason to delay taxation.
The comparative statics exercise shows that permanent changes in target statistics would have a hard time explaining substantial changes in long-run debt. It all comes down again on how easy or difficult it is for the private sector to substitute away from the good being taxed by inflation, i.e. on the value of ρ. The key then seems to be finding ways to "flatten" the money growth rate function, i.e. reduce the incentive for the government to use the inflation tax when debt becomes large.
One could for example, think of ways to increase the cost of inflation. This would prevent the government from running large inflation rates when debt is large and thus increase steady state debt or reduce the degree of complementarity between consumption goods that is needed for a given target of debt over GDP. One could argue legal or political reasons why governments cannot raise the inflation rate to elevated levels. Instead of considering these possible extensions, lets check a reduced-form example.
Say the government -but not the households-faces a cost of deviating from a target inflation. This cost could be represented in utils and hence subtracted from the flow utility every period. One possible cost function is φ(π − π) 2 .
By setting φ high enough, we can ensure that inflation won't differ much from the target π. Moreover, in steady state, the added cost of inflation will be zero. So, say that φ = 100 and π = 0.043. To target the benchmark statistics we need to modify two parameters: α = 0.039 and ρ = −2.67. Hence, this simple modification allows for significant reduction in the complementarity between cash and credit goods. Still, it is not a sufficient modification if we want to increase the steady state debt: if we don't change any parameter values, the inclusion of the inflation cost function brings the steady state level of debt to 33.7% of GDP, i.e. only 2.7 percentage points above the targeted statistic.
The reason why this modification doesn't work well, is that it is only affecting the inflation rate between today and tomorrow. Nothing prevents the government from inflating prices today to reduce the real value of beginning-of-period debt. Another way to put it is: the inflation cost function affects the decision of what state of the world the government decides for tomorrow and not on what it does today. In this sense, more thought needs to be put to successfully prevent the government from running this type of scheme.
Stochastic government expenditure
Countries frequently increase their public debt when government expenditure temporarily increases. Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing argument works well along this dimension, so it is important to test the model on this.
It is relatively simple to add stochastic government expenditure to the model. Say there is a normal level of expenditure g 1 and a high level of expenditure g 2 , which happens only sporadically and doesn't last for too long. If today we are in the normal expenditure state, then tomorrow the government will have to spend g 1 with probability θ 1 and g 2 with probability 1 − θ 1 . Likewise, if today we are in the high expenditure state, then tomorrow the government will have to spend g 1 with probability 1 − θ 2 and g 2 with probability θ 2 .
If today the exogenous state is g 1 then the first-order conditions of the representative household become
where the "1" or "2" subscripts refer to whether a variable corresponds to state g 1 or g 2 , respectively. For functions, use a superscript to denote that they are being evaluated at the corresponding state. Of course, there is also a set of corresponding first-order conditions when the state today is g 2 .
As before, it is possible to summarize (26), (27) and (28) into a single equation
This function is now a bit more complicated than before, since it includes n 1 , n 2 , p 1 and p 2 (which are all functions ofB ). The superscript on the η function indicates what probabilities to use (in this case, θ 1 and 1 − θ 1 ).
Now we are ready to write the problem of the government. For expositional simplicity, lets ignore (26) as a constraint, although when solving the model one has to be aware that it may be binding. So, given that the exogenous state is g 1 and that future governments will induce N 1 and P 1 if the state is g 1 and N 2 and P 2 if the state is g 2 , the problem of the government is
Whereas if the exogenous state is g 2 then the problem of the government is
Hence, a Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of functions
For the exercise, lets adopt the same parametrization as in the benchmark calibration plus: g 1 = 0.06, g 2 = 0.08, θ 1 = 0.975 and θ 2 = 0.5. Hence, the state with normal expenditure has an identical parametrization as the benchmark case. The other state has 33% more expenditure (g/y raises from 20% to 27%), a moderate increase, much smaller than the experienced for example during World War II in the US. The probabilities imply that on average, the state with high expenditure occurs once every 40 years and has a duration of 2 years. In sum, it is a state that shows a moderate increase in government expenditure, occurs infrequently and is not expected to last long.
The solution shows that the equilibrium debt function in the high expenditure state (B 2 ) is always above the one for the normal expenditure state (B 1 ). The same happens for the tax and money growth rate functions. So, when the economy moves from the low to the high expenditure state, we should expect an increase ofB , τ and µ. Interestingly enough, the debt function for the deterministic case lies in between the two debt functions for the stochastic case. When compared to the deterministic case, the government in the normal expenditure state has a lower incentive to have debt, since it internalizes the fact that it will have to distort the economy more when expenditure increases. In this sense, the steady state for g 1 has debt over GDP of almost 30% and an annual inflation rate of around 2%. On the other hand, if the economy stays in the high expenditure state long enough, then debt over GDP climbs to 43%, with an inflation rate of 53% annual. This means that economies with a transitory increase in government expenditure should show a higher debt to GDP ratio. The problem with the model is that it also predicts very high inflation rates. This is due to the fact that the money growth rate function starts to climb very rapidly with high levels of debt.
A simulation of the stochastic model is run for 1, 000 periods. The averages of variables are similar to the steady state statistics of the deterministic case. Figure 4 shows a sample of 100 periods in which the high expenditure state occurs 3 times and lasts 7, 3 and 2 periods, respectively 18 . The figure shows two variables: B/py and B /py, i.e. beginning and end of period debt over GDP. Regardless of how it is measured, debt to GDP increases more the longer the economy stays in the high expenditure state. It is also clear that debt remains high for several periods after the economy returns to the normal expenditure state. In other words, the expenditure shock has a persistent effect on the level of debt.
The time series for B/py shows a decrease for the period in which there is a change from normal to high expenditure. This can also be seen in the data and the reason is that B corresponds to beginningof-period debt, while prices and hours react to the new state (both increase). If we measured debt over GDP as we do with the data, we would use B /py, i.e. end-of-period debt over period GDP. In this case, debt to GDP increases much more, up to almost 60%, and doesn't show an initial decline. The reason for the large discrepancy between the two series is inflation. This can be seen when the economy is in the normal expenditure state: here the two series differ by only a small amount. Concurrent with the increase in debt, there is an increase in taxes and a sharp increase in inflation. In the case of this particular sample, labor taxes raise up to 23.6% and inflation increases up to 41.8%. When the economy gets back to the normal expenditure state, taxes and inflation react differently. Labor taxes diminish sharply well below normal expenditure steady state (down to 16.2% after the 7 periods of high expenditure), whereas inflation diminishes gradually towards the normal expenditure steady state. This is just a consequence of labor taxes being decreasing in debt (for a given expenditure state) and the money growth rate being increasing. This dynamics is in sharp contrast with the tax-smoothing argument.
It is possible to increase debt in the high expenditure state by modifying some of the parameters. In this sense, one would need to do any of the following: lower g 1 , raise g 2 , raise θ 1 or lower θ 2 .
Both lowering g 1 or raising g 2 increases the distance between the debt functions of the two states, i.e. lowers the incentive to issue debt in the normal expenditure state and increases it in the high expenditure state. The effect is small for the former and large for the latter. For example if g 1 is set to 0.05 -which implies g/y = 16.7%-then the debt to GDP ratio in steady state for the high expenditure state increases to 48%. With a lower g 1 , the government with high expenditure can increase the debt more since it knows that when expenditure returns to normal, the government won't have to distort as much as before. On the other hand, if we increase g 2 then, since it is only temporary, the government in the high expenditure state prefers to run a higher deficit so as not to distort the economy too much. The effects are similar in magnitude as in the case of lowering g 1 , although the effect on debt for the normal expenditure case is more noticeable and inflation in the high expenditure case is a lot higher. Both modifications indicate that if governments in normal times expect high increases of expenditure in the future, then their debt policy will be more conservative so as to lower the distortions necessary to finance the higher expenditure.
Raising θ 1 , which means making the high expenditure state less frequent, increases the debt function in both states, but only slightly. In the case of the normal expenditure state, the closer θ 1 is to 1, the closer the debt function is to the deterministic case in which only the normal expenditure state exists.
More interestingly, lowering θ 2 , i.e. lowering the average duration of the high expenditure state, also increases the debt function in both states. The effects on the normal expenditure state are hardly noticeable but can be really large in the high expenditure state. For example, if we set θ 2 to 0.05 then the steady state debt to GDP for the high expenditure state increases to 51%. Of course, with such a low probability it would be a rare event that the high expenditure state lasts long enough to get there.
In sum, events that were expected to increase government expenditure more, to be less frequent and last shorter, make governments increase the debt more when the shock arrives. Additionally, the larger is the increase in expenditure, the more conservative is the government's debt policy in normal times.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a theory of debt that delivers an interior steady state that is independent of initial conditions, and that performs well when calibrated to fit certain US data. The key elements are nominal government debt and lack of commitment. The theory also works qualitatively well in explaining how countries react when there is a temporary increase in government expenditure, but in this case there is no tax-smoothing. Still, the model is unable to explain why some countries exhibit persistently very large amounts of debt. The reason is that when debt is large, the government has large incentives to reduce it by inflating prices. Further study should be devoted to think of ways to limit this. Natural candidates are self-control, reputation and political economy reasons. The model also has relatively little structure so it can be easily modified to include additional motives for debt.
